Can impeachment be appealed

United States , supra , dismissed , F. That in the trial of any impeachment the Presiding Officer of the Senate, if the Senate so orders, shall appoint a committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony at such times and places as the committee may determine, and for such purpose the committee so appointed and the chairman thereof, to be elected by the committee, shall unless otherwise ordered by the Senate exercise all the powers and functions conferred upon the Senate and the Presiding Officer of the Senate, respectively, under the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials.

Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials shall govern the procedure and practice of the committee so appointed. The committee so appointed shall report to the Senate in writing a certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given before the committee, and such report shall be received by the Senate and the evidence so received and the testimony so taken shall be considered to all intents and purposes, subject to the right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and materiality, as having received and taken before the Senate, but nothing herein shall prevent the Senate from sending for any witness and hearing his testimony in open Senate, or by order of the Senate having the entire trial in open Senate.

Former Judge Nixon, "arguing that the Senate's failure to give him a full evidentiary hearing before the entire Senate violated its constitutional duty to "try" all impeachments[,] The district court held that his claim was nonjusticiable. The U. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed. Judge Williams, writing for the court, determined that the constitutional language granting the Senate the "sole Power to try all impeachments" also "gives it sole discretion to choose its procedures.

This "textual commitment of impeachment trials to the Senate," coupled with the need for finality, led the court to apply the political question doctrine in determining that the issue presented by former Judge Nixon was nonjusticiable. Judge Randolph, in his concurrence, framed the question before the court as "whether the judiciary can pass upon the validity of the Senate's procedural decisions.

My conclusion that the courts have no such role to play in the impeachment process rests on my interpretation of the Constitution. His analysis seems to focus specifically upon the text of the constitutional grant to the Senate of the sole power to try impeachments and upon the framers' intentional exclusion of the Judiciary from a role in the impeachment process, rather than upon the political question doctrine. Judge Edwards concurred in the judgment but dissented in part.

He would have found former Judge Nixon's constitutional challenge justiciable, but would find "that the Senate's use of a special committee to hear witnesses and gather evidence did not deprive Nixon of any constitutionally protected right. The Nixon case was decided by the Supreme Court on January 13, Nixon v. The Court held the issue before them to be nonjusticiable. The Chief Justice based this conclusion upon the fact that the impeachment proceedings were textually committed in the Constitution to the legislative branch.

In addition, the Court found the "lack of finality and the difficulty in fashioning relief counsel[led] against justiciability. To open "the door of judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate in trying impeachments would 'expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos. The Court found that the word "try" in the Impeachment Clause did not "provide an identifiable textual limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate.

Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, emphasized the significance of the framers' decision to assign the impeachment power to the legislative branch. Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgment, but found nothing in the Constitution to foreclose the Court's consideration of the constitutional sufficiency of the Senate's Rule XI procedure. Justices White and Blackmun, addressing the merits of the claim before the Court, were of the opinion that the Senate had fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" Judge Nixon.

Justice Souter agreed with the majority that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question, although his reasoning was somewhat different. The Impeachment Trial Clause commits to the Senate "the sole Power to try all Impeachments," subject to three procedural requirements: the Senate shall be on oath or affirmation; the Chief Justice shall preside when the President is tried; and conviction shall be upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present.

It seems fair to conclude that the Clause contemplates that the Senate may determine, within broad boundaries, such subsidiary issues as the procedures for receipt and consideration of evidence necessary to satisfy its duty to "try" impeachments.

Justice Souter found the conclusion that the case presented a non-justiciable political question supported by the "'the unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,' [and] 'the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements from various departments on one question.

Carr , U. He noted, however, that. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. The court there framed the question before it as follows:. The key issue in this case is whether a life-tenured Article III judge who has been acquitted of felony charges by a petit jury can thereafter be impeached and tried for essentially the same alleged indiscretion by a committee of the United States Senate consisting of less than the full Senate.

This court determines that the answer is no. Judge Sporkin determined that his court was not foreclosed from reaching a decision in the Hastings case by what might have been viewed as a controlling court of appeals decision in Nixon , because the Supreme Court had agreed to take certiorari in Nixon on issues identical to those before him. Judge Sporkin concluded that the issue before him was justiciable and, further, that the Rule XI procedure did not provide an adequate "trial" before the full Senate.

In particular, the court considered the taking of evidence a process which required the presence of all the Senators, so that each could judge credibility with his or her own eyes and ears. Judge Sporkin stayed his judgment pending appeal. After the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v.

United States, supra , the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, on its own motion, vacated and remanded the Hastings decision for reconsideration in light of Nixon. Hastings v. On remand, Judge Sporkin dismissed the case. In doing so reluctantly, Judge Sporkin emphasized the factual differences between the two cases, but concluded that the Nixon decision compelled dismissal of the case before him. Also of great assistance in exploring precedents in this area is Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, ch.

Holmes Brown and Charles W. Senate conduct of impeachment trials is governed by the "Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials.

Claiborne, although many of the rules predate the Claiborne impeachment. August 15, , was prepared at the time of the Claiborne proceeding pursuant to S. As these are Senate rules, that body can, where it deems such action appropriate, revise or amend the rules. Consideration of the appropriateness of such revisions is not unusual when a Senate impeachment trial is anticipated or is at a very early stage of the Senate proceedings.

In any impeachment inquiry, the Members of the legislative branch must confront some preliminary questions to determine whether an impeachment is appropriate in a given situation. The first of these questions is whether the individual whose conduct is under scrutiny falls within the category of President, Vice President, or "civil Officers of the United States" such that he is vulnerable to impeachment. One facet of this question in some cases is whether the resignation of the individual under scrutiny forecloses further impeachment proceedings against him.

A second preliminary question is whether the conduct involved constitutes "treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors. In the history of the United States, 16 full impeachment trials have taken place. Delahay, of the U. District Court for the District of Kansas, was begun when the Members of the House appeared before the bar of the Senate to impeach the judge at the end of the third session of the 34 th Congress.

No articles of impeachment were presented at that time. After the judge resigned, there were no further proceedings. An 18 th Senate trial, that of George W. English, U. District Judge for the Eastern District of Illinois, was commenced in the Senate, but did not go forward to a judgment on the merits of the case because of the judge's resignation and the House Managers' recommendation and the Senate's agreement that the impeachment proceedings be dismissed.

Similarly, a 19 th Senate trial, regarding Samuel B. Kent, U. District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, ended when the Senate agreed to a motion by Senator Harry Reid to dismiss the articles of impeachment after the judge resigned and the House Managers requested that the impeachment proceedings be discontinued.

In addition to those impeachment investigations which have resulted in Senate trials, there have been a number of instances in which the impeachment process has been initiated in the House of Representatives that have not resulted in articles of impeachment being voted against the subjects of those inquiries.

For example, in , the House of Representatives adopted a resolution authorizing the House Committee on the Judiciary to investigate the conduct of District Judge Mark H. Other examples of impeachment resolutions, inquiries, or investigations regarding federal judges that, for various reasons, 59 did not result in articles of impeachment being voted by the House include those regarding: Lebbeus R.

United States , Ct. Constitution and 2 challenging the constitutional validity of a one-House veto provision in the Federal Salary Act of , 2 U. No further action was taken. Among the inquiries into conduct of executive branch officers which did not result in Senate trials were those regarding: H. Daugherty ; Clarence C. Mellon, as Secretary of the Treasury discontinued before completion of the investigation because of Mellon's resignation from the position of Secretary of the Treasury upon his nomination and confirmation as Ambassador to the Court of St.

Nixon President's resignation occurred before the Articles of Impeachment were voted upon by the House; report of the Judiciary Committee recommending impeachment and including articles of impeachment submitted to the House; House adopted a resolution accepting the report, noting the action of the committee and commending its chairman and Members for their efforts, but no further action was taken upon the impeachment ; and Andrew Young, United States Ambassador to the United Nations measure considered in House; motion to table passed by House.

The following are examples of those which went no further than committee or subcommittee referral: resolution to impeach the Ambassador to Iran referred to House Judiciary Committee ; resolution to impeach United States Ambassador to the United Nations referred to House Judiciary Committee ; resolution directing House Judiciary Committee to investigate whether to impeach Attorney General of United States referred to House Rules and Administration ; resolutions to impeach the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and referred to Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary ; resolutions to impeach members of the Federal Open Market Committee and referred to Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Committee ; resolutions to impeach President Ronald Reagan and referred to House Judiciary Committee ; and resolutions to impeach President George W.

Bush two in , one in , two in referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary ; a resolution impeaching Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr referred to House Judiciary Committee ; 63 a resolution directing the House Committee on the Judiciary to undertake an inquiry into whether grounds existed to impeach President William Jefferson Clinton, to report its findings, and, if the committee so determined, a resolution of impeachment referred to House Committee on Rules ; 64 a resolution to impeach Secretary of Defense Donald R.

Gonzales should be impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors referred to the House Rules Committee. As is apparent from the instances noted above, the impeachment mechanism, while not used frequently, has provided a means of exploring allegations of misconduct involving, with the one notable exception of Senator Blount, civil officers from both the judicial and executive branches.

The bulk of the inquiries begun have not resulted in impeachment trials; of those which have gone to trial, less than half of them have led to convictions, all involving federal judges. The impeachment process provides a means of monitoring and checking misconduct by such officials through the use of a legislative forum. The mechanism is a cumbersome one which takes time away from other legislative business. Yet its very cumbersomeness might be viewed as necessary to minimize the chance that so serious a course would be engaged in lightly; in this light, its complex and somewhat unwieldy nature could be considered an attempt to deter unwarranted legislative intrusions into the business and personnel of the other two branches.

The impeachment process might be seen as a constitutional effort to balance these two countervailing forces. A perusal of the examples included in the list of impeachment trials and of inquiries with an eye towards possible impeachment may provide some indication as to what sort of officials have been considered "civil Officers of the United States" within the scope of the impeachment powers.

The term is not defined in the Constitution. With the exception of the trial of Senator Blount, all of those listed above were from either the executive or the judicial branch. Senator Blount was not convicted in his impeachment trial. During that trial the Congress wrestled with the question of whether a Senator was a civil officer subject to impeachment.

The Senate concluded that he was not and that it lacked jurisdiction over him for impeachment purposes. He was acquitted on that basis. Clearly the precedents show that federal judges have been considered to fall within the sweep of the "Civil Officer" language.

There have been instances where questions have been raised as to whether the congressional printer, 66 a former vice-consul-general, 67 or a territorial judge 68 could be impeached. In addition, a House committee concluded that a Commissioner of the District of Columbia was not a civil officer for impeachment purposes. II, Sec. He shall Reliance in this argument is placed upon a statement of the Supreme Court in United States v.

Mouat , U. Unless a person in the service of the government hold his place by virtue of an appointment by the President, or of one of the courts of justice or heads of departments authorized by law to make such an appointment, he is not, strictly speaking, an officer of the United States.

It is clear that a private citizen is not subject to impeachment, except as to those offenses committed while holding federal public office. Belknap resigned just prior to the adoption of impeachment articles by the House. The Senate, after having given exhaustive consideration to the arguments of the House managers and counsel for the respondent, concluded that the former Secretary of War was amenable to trial by impeachment for acts done in that office, despite his resignation from office before he was impeached.

Belknap's demurrer to the replication of the House on the ground that the Senate lacked jurisdiction to go forward with the impeachment was therefore overruled. The second fundamental issue which each Congress contemplating impeachment of a federal official must confront is whether the conduct in question falls within the constitutional parameters of "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

III, Sec. The Constitution requires that a conviction on a charge of treason be supported by the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or a confession in open court. The statutory language expressly applies only to those owing allegiance to the United States. Bribery is not defined in the Constitution, although it was an offense at common law, and the First Congress enacted a bribery statute, the Act of April 30, , 1 Stat.

The phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" is not defined in the Constitution or in statute. It was used in many of the English impeachments, which were proceedings in which criminal sanctions could be imposed upon conviction. As Alex Simpson, Jr. No definitive list of types of conduct falling within the "high crimes and misdemeanors" language has been forthcoming as a result of this debate, but some measure of clarification has emerged.

Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7 appears to anticipate that some of the conduct within this ambit may also provide grounds for criminal prosecution. It indicates that the impeachment process does not foreclose judicial action. Its phrasing might be regarded as implying that the impeachment proceedings would precede the judicial process, but, as is evident from the impeachments of Judge Claiborne in , and of Judges Hastings and Nixon in and , at least as to federal judges and probably as to most civil officers subject to impeachment under the Constitution, the impeachment process may also follow the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.

Whether impeachment and removal of a President must precede any criminal prosecution is as yet an unanswered question.

The debate on the impeachable offenses during the Constitutional Convention in indicates that criminal conduct was at least part of what was included in the "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors" language. For example, Judge John Pickering was convicted on all four of the articles of impeachment brought against him. Among those charges were allegations of mishandling a case before him in contravention of federal laws and procedures: 1 by delivering a ship which was the subject of a condemnation proceeding for violation of customs laws to the claimant without requiring bond to be posted after the ship had been attached by the marshal; 2 by refusing to hear some of the testimony offered by the United States in that case; and 3 by refusing to grant the United States an appeal despite the fact that the United States was entitled to an appeal as a matter of right under federal law.

However, the fourth article against him alleged that he appeared on the bench in an intemperate and intoxicated state. Judge Halsted Ritter was acquitted of six of the seven articles brought against him. He was convicted on the seventh, which summarized or listed the first six articles and charged that the "reasonable and probable consequences of the actions or conduct" involved therein were "to bring his court into scandal and disrepute, to the prejudice of said court and public confidence in the Federal judiciary, and to render him unfit to continue to serve as such judge.

This article was challenged unsuccessfully on a point of order based upon the contention that article VII repeated and combined facts, circumstances and charges from the preceding six articles. It has been suggested that the impeachment provisions and the "good behaviour" language of the judicial tenure provision in Article III, Sec. Print, September 17, , as cited in 3 Deschler's ch.

These concepts shared some common ground. As the Subcommittee observed:. Both concepts would allow a judge to be impeached for acts which occur in the exercise of judicial office that 1 involved criminal conduct in violation of law, or 2 that involved serious dereliction from public duty, but not necessarily in violation of positive statutory law or forbidden by the common law.

Sloth, drunkenness on the bench, or unwarranted and unreasonable impartiality [sic? When such misbehavior occurs in connection with the federal office, actual criminal conduct should not be a requisite to impeachment of a judge or any other federal official.

While such conduct need not be criminal, it nonetheless must be sufficiently serious to be offenses against good morals and injurious to the social body. Both concepts would allow a judge to be impeached for conduct not connected with the duties and responsibilities of the judicial office which involve [sic] criminal acts in violation of law.

Thus it would appear that this common ground represented those general principles which the Subcommittee deemed fundamental to conduct upon which impeachment of a federal judge could be based. In connection with the impeachment of Judge Samuel B. Kent, the House Judiciary Committee, in H.

The House and Senate have both interpreted the phrase broadly, finding that impeachable offenses need not be limited to criminal conduct. Congress has repeatedly defined "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" to be serious violations of the public trust, not necessarily indictable offenses under criminal laws. Where a judge's conduct calls into question his or her integrity or impartiality, Congress must consider whether impeachment and removal of the judge from office is necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial branch and uphold the public trust.

There is no constitutional parallel to the judicial "good behaviour" language applicable to executive officials. The House Judiciary Committee, in recommending articles of impeachment against President Richard Nixon in , appears to have premised those articles on the theory that President Nixon abused the powers of his office, causing "injury to the confidence of the nation and great prejudice to the cause of law and justice," and resulting in subversion of constitutional government; that he failed to carry out his constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the laws; and that he failed to comply with congressional subpoenas needed to provide relevant evidence for the impeachment investigation.

Two of the articles brought against the President asserted that he sought to set aside the rightful authority of Congress and to bring it into reproach, disrepute and contempt by "harangues" criticizing the Congress and questioning its legislative authority. The only other executive branch officer to go to trial on articles of impeachment was Secretary of War Belknap.

The articles alleged that he, in an exercise of his authority as Secretary of War, appointed John Evans to maintain a trading post at Fort Sill, and allowed Evans to continue in that position, as part of an arrangement which provided Belknap personal gain. Belknap resigned before the Senate trial on his impeachment and was not convicted on any of these articles. The House has impeached and the Senate has tried a federal judge based upon articles of impeachment alleging misconduct committed in his then current federal offices and misconduct committed while he was serving in his previous federal office.

In , in response to H. Department of Justice of charges of improper conduct by Judge Robert W. Archbald, which had been brought to the President's attention by the Commissioner of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Archbald was impeached by the House and tried by the Senate in the 62 nd Congress, he was a U. Commerce Court. The articles of impeachment brought against him alleged misconduct in those positions as well as in his previous position as a U.

District Judge. Some other allegations of misconduct occurring in both prior and current federal offices have been investigated by the House with an eye toward impeachment. For example, on March 1, , after investigating the administration of the office of consulate-general in Shanghai, China, during the terms of George F.

Seward, former consul-general and then current envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America to China, and two others, a Member presented to the House the report of the majority of the Committee on Expenditures in the State Department, consisting of 17 articles of impeachment alleging misconduct by Seward both while consul-general in Shanghai and while minister to China.

In recommending a resolution impeaching Seward for high crimes and misdemeanors while in office, the committee referred to him in both his former and then current official capacities. The House, on March 3, , the last day of the 45 th Congress, voted to consider the report, but dilatory proceedings thereafter prevented any action on it.

In connection with the same investigation, on March 22, , the House Committee on Expenditures in the State Department reported a recommendation that Oliver B. Bradford, "late vice-consul-general at Shanghai, China," and "late clerk of the consular court of the United States at Shanghai," and, at the time of the report, both postal agent of the United States in Shanghai and consular clerk of the United States in Shanghai, be impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors while in office. The committee also reported 10 articles of impeachment.

While the committee Members were in agreement that the evidence sustained the charges, some Members of the committee questioned whether Bradford was an impeachable officer. A motion to refer the entire matter to the House Judiciary Committee was agreed to without division. Judge G. Thomas Porteous was the first person to have been impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate based, in part, upon conduct occurring before he began his tenure in his federal office.

Article I and article II each alleged misconduct beginning while he was a state court judge as well as misconduct while he was a federal judge. Article IV alleged false statements in connection with his nomination and confirmation to the U.

District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The allegations in article IV involved entirely pre-federal conduct, albeit conduct directly related to his appointment to the federal bench. Article III alleged personal misconduct in connection with his Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. On December 8, , he was convicted on all four articles, removed from office, and disqualified from holding future federal offices.

On the other hand, it does not appear that any President, Vice President, or other civil officer of the United States has been impeached by the House solely on the basis of conduct occurring before he began his tenure in the office held at the time of the impeachment investigation, although the House has, on occasion, investigated such allegations.

Calhoun requesting an impeachment investigation into whether his prior conduct as Secretary of War constituted an impeachable offense by referring the matter to a select committee. After an extensive investigation, the select committee reported back recommending that the House take no action. The House laid the measure on the table. Pursuant to a resolution agreed to on December 2, , the Speaker pro tempore of the House appointed a special committee "to investigate and ascertain whether any member of this House was bribed by Oakes Ames or any other person in any matter touching his legislative duty.

While as Vice President Colfax was subject to impeachment, as a Member of the House he was not an impeachable officer. After a review of past federal, state, and British impeachment precedents, the House Judiciary Committee stated that, in light of the pertinent U.

For the reasons so hastily stated, and many more which might be adduced, your committee conclude that both the impeaching power bestowed upon the two Houses by the Constitution and the power of expulsion are remedial only and not punitive so as to extend to all crimes at all times, and are not to be used in any constitutional sense or right for the purpose of punishing any man for a crime committed before he becomes a member of the House or in case of a civil officer as just cause of impeachment; We have therefore come to the opinion that so far as receiving and holding an interest in the Credit Mobilier stock is concerned there is nothing in the testimony submitted to us which would warrant impeachment in the case of the Vice President.

The views of the minority of the committee were also printed in the Congressional Globe. Representative Clarkson Potter dissented from much of the committee's report, but was "constrained to consent to the recommendation that at this stage of the session they be discharged from the subject.

He concluded that he did not "feel so clearly justified in holding, either upon principle, precedent, or authority, that Congress has the power to impeach a civil officer such as the Vice President for crime committed before induction into such office as to make [him] willing to recommend an impeachment for such an offense at a time when the impeachment cannot possibly be tried. Goodrich dissented from the report and, in particular, from "the principle [the committee] asserts that an officer of the United States or a member of this House is not liable either to impeachment or expulsion for any offense whatever, committed prior to the commencement of his term, during which the question of his impeachment or expulsion is raised.

The committee's report was made in the House on February 24, , briefly debated, and then postponed to February 26, In contrast, approximately years later, then-Vice President Spiro Agnew wrote a letter to the House seeking an impeachment investigation of allegations against him concerning his conduct while governor of Maryland.

The Speaker declined to take up the matter because it was pending before the courts. The House took no substantive action on seven related resolutions, seemingly because of concerns regarding the matter's pendency in the courts and regarding the fact that the conduct involved occurred before Agnew began his tenure as Vice President.

This review of some of the precedents on the question of what constitutes an impeachable offense suggests that the answer to this question is less than completely clear. Serious criminal conduct appears to be a sufficient ground, whether the person involved is a judge or a member of the executive branch.

Where the person to be impeached is the President or an executive officer, conduct having criminal intent, serious abuses of the power of the office involved, failure to carry out the duties of that office, and, possibly, interference with the Congress in an impeachment investigation of the President or other executive official may be enough to support an article of impeachment.

As to federal judges, the impeachment language might be read in light of the constitutional language providing that they serve during good behavior. With this in mind, a judge may be vulnerable to impeachment, not only for criminal conduct, but also for improper judicial conduct involving a serious dereliction of duty; or serious misconduct, including personal misconduct, placing the judge, the court or the judiciary in disrepute; or casting doubt upon his integrity and the integrity of the judiciary.

An impeachment article may also address misconduct occurring before the commencement of an individual's tenure in a federal office where there is a connection between that prior misconduct and conduct in the federal office. False statements in connection with a nomination and confirmation to a federal office may also be the basis of an article of impeachment.

However, historically views have differed as to whether an impeachment might be based solely upon conduct committed prior to the commencement of a federal officer's tenure in his current federal position. It is unclear whether a federal officer would be subject to impeachment for conduct committed in a prior federal office, where both current and past offices were within the reach of the impeachment power. Nor is it clear whether an impeachment would lie against a federal officer currently holding a position covered by the constitutional impeachment authority, where the alleged misconduct at issue occurred while he held a position in the U.

Past precedent also suggests that, if state court proceedings are pending regarding alleged misconduct in a previously held state office, the House may decline to pursue an impeachment investigation of a person currently holding a federal office within the scope of the impeachment power based upon such allegations.

The American impeachment process, a constitutionally based remedy, provides a legislative mechanism for investigating and trying allegations of some forms of serious misconduct on the part of the President, Vice President, and "civil Officers of the United States.

It has been found not to apply to Senators, and, although a parallel case does not exist as to Members of the House of Representatives, it seems likely that, on similar lines of reasoning, it would also be found inapplicable to them. The "civil Officer" language is not defined in the Constitution, and its outer limits are still somewhat unclear.

It has been used to reach Cabinet level officials. It may be argued that it should be regarded as reaching anyone whose appointment to an office of public trust must be in compliance with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Private citizens are not vulnerable to impeachment. It's important to note that first and foremost, Congress must next file formal charges against the president, and that they haven't impeached Trump yet.

Now, the House Judiciary Committee is supposed to assess the allegations of the impeachable actions and vote on each of the claims before passing them along to the House of Representatives, who will then vote on them as well. Only then will the Senate, which is Republican-controlled at the moment, hold a trial to determine whether the charges are enough to remove the federal official from office.

The Senate's decision is final as the governing body as "the sole power to try all impeachments," per the Supreme Court, meaning that the president cannot appeal its final vote.

In other words, if President Trump is impeached by the Senate and removed from office, that will be the end of the road. However, considering the Senate's track record of not voting to convict a sitting president during impeachment both Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton were ultimately not convicted, and Nixon resigned before the Senate could do so , that's pretty unlikely.

What little precedent we have in such cases suggests that chief justices keep their heads down and, so far as possible, defer assiduously to the will of the Senate majority. In the trial of President Andrew Johnson which was a real trial, with extensive witness testimony and presentation of exhibits , Chief Justice Salmon Chase was consistently deferential to the Senate, often making provisional rulings and immediately inviting senators to register dissent.

Chief Justice William Rehnquist was similarly meek during the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton, although he was called upon to do less because the case was effectively submitted to the Senate on stipulated facts. The exceptional degree of partisanship that has characterized the Trump impeachment may counsel even greater caution from Roberts. First, if he were to render a provisional ruling on a procedural or evidentiary point — say admitting contested evidence — under the rules, his ruling would stand unless a majority of the Senate voted to the contrary.

However, before this situation could arise, Roberts would have to have made a ruling himself, rather than immediately deferring to a Senate vote. This result flows from the fact that the chief justice, when acting as presiding officer, is not a judge, but instead assumes the role otherwise played by the vice president in nonpresidential impeachments.

And we know that Chase did break a procedural tie during the Johnson impeachment, and his exertion of authority was upheld by the Senate. That said, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and the Republicans can maintain complete control over every aspect of the upcoming proceeding so long as they maintain a solid block of 51 votes.

In the end, I doubt that Democrats have much to hope for from Roberts, or that Republicans have much to fear. Posted in What's Happening Now. Specifically, did Austin, Texas, violate the free-speech rights of advertising companies when it regulated "off-premises" business signs more strictly than "on-premises" signs?

AHoweBlogger explains:. In , the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that an Arizona town could not impose different restrictions on the One case challenges Congress' exclusion of Puerto Rico from a federal safety-net program. The other involves the right of death-row prisoners to receive spiritual guidance in their final moments. Two cases today: a lawsuit against the FBI for surveilling Muslim Americans, and a technical copyright dispute.

But some justices seemed reluctant to wade into broader questions about the right to carry guns in public. AHoweBlogger's full analysis:. This article was updated on Nov. The role of the chief justice in an impeachment trial By Frank Bowman on Jan 10, at am. In First Amendment challenge to city billboard rules, justices will be sign language interpreters - SCOTUSblog In , the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that an Arizona town could not impose different restrictions on the