What do pantheists worship

Like them it is critical of beliefs that depend on faith in impossibilities, or unproven revelations in ancient books. But atheism is essentially defined by a single proposition. It states that there is no creator God, and no other supernatural gods, and nothing more.

Usually atheism implies respect for certain approaches, for example realism, physicalism, demand for very strong evidence of improbable claims, rejection of scriptural or priestly authority claims as a source of truth. All of these are valid and valuable. But these are the ways in which people arrive at atheism - they don't constitute part of the definition of atheism. Atheism does not claim to be a comprehensive philosophy. You can be an atheist and believe in reincarnation, or the law of attraction, or crystal healing, or be skeptical of all of these.

You can be an atheist and love nature, or detest nature, love life or hate it. In other words, atheism is like a starting point: if you want a system of ethics and attitudes to life, you have to add them on top, and from other sources.

Humanism has tried to develop a positive philosophy and ethics, but sometimes this has been too anthropocentric, too confident of human superiority, too nervous of appearing even remotely like anything called "religion" or spirituality. Scientific pantheism goes beyond atheism in offering a positive approach to the world and a a reverent attitude towards nature and the universe.

It affirms our unity with these, and rejects the idea of human mastery over nature or human pre-eminence in the cosmos. It takes our relationship to nature and to the universe as the center of our religion, our ethics and our aesthetics.

Panentheists and pantheists share the view that the universe and every natural thing in it is in some sense worth of reverence. However, pan-en-theos means "all-in-God" - that is, the universe is contained within God, not God in the universe. Panentheists believe in a God who is present in everything but also extends beyond the universe.

In other words, God is greater than the universe. Often they also believe that this God has a mind, created the universe, and cares about each of us personally.

Pantheists believe that the universe itself is the prime focus for reverence. They do not believe in personal or creator gods. Only the etymology. In Greek pan means all, theos means god, while poly means many. Very confusingly, many dictionaries give an alternative definition of pantheism as "belief in all the gods. Pantheism was first recorded in this erroneous sense in - one hundred and five years after its first use in the original sense - by Francis Palgrave. Palgrave wrote: "The great proportion of the Tartar tribes professed a singular species of Pantheism, respecting all creeds, attached to none.

Other people repeated his mistake, and their usage was recorded in the first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary published between and It's important to note that this second "meaning" is almost never used today.

It it incompatible with and contradictory to the original meaning. Polytheism usually means belief in the several gods of a particular national culture.

Pantheism in its second sense means belief in all the gods of ALL the nations. This second meaning of pantheism is never used today in books on religion or philosophy. It only persists in dictionaries because it crept into the OED, the mother of all dictionaries, consulted by every new dictionary-compiler. And it only crept into the OED because of a mistaken use of the word!

There are many points in common between paganism and Pantheism. Most pagans say they are pantheists. They too revere Nature and the Universe and regard them as in some sense unified wholes. They too celebrate solstices, equinoxes and other natural passages. They too have a strong environmental ethic and a deep love of nature.

Many pagans are basically pantheists, using the gods and spirits of paganism as a metaphoric way of expressing their reverence for the Universe and Nature.

Some people feel the need for symbols and personages to mediate their relationship with nature and the cosmos. There is no harm in this, as long as the symbols help us to connect to Reality and do not block or distort our view of Reality. Most scientific pantheists relate directly to the universe and to nature, without the need for any intermediary symbols or deities.

The cosmos manifests itself directly to us in nature and the night sky. However, many pagans are literal polytheists, they believe the the existence of gods and spirits, and often believe in magic, reincarnation, and the irrational. Scientific pantheists are not polytheists, and do not believe in magic, or disembodied spirits. Most of them do not believe in a personal afterlife, whether through reincarnation or transport to any kind of non-material "heaven.

Animism is the belief that every living thing in nature - including trees, plants and even rocks or streams - has its own spirit or divinity. In primitive societies animism often requires that before anyone can kill an animal or fell a tree, its natural spirit must be placated.

Pantheism is in a sense a natural development of animism. Pantheism celebrates the "numinosity" or awesomeness of the whole of the universe and nature. This whole possesses the power, the creativity, the awe and mystery that we need for a focus of our spiritual feelings. However, the whole exists through and in its parts. Every natural thing from the sun to a grain of sand, from a giant sequoia to a bacterium, is a part of the whole. Every natural thing has the quality of being a distinctive organization of matter with its own unique character and dignity.

Only animals have nervous systems. But all living things have communication systems, through which information about the external world is transmitted by way of chemical and electrical messages. Even inanimate objects are shaped by and shape their environment and in that sense are responsive. The scientific pantheist attitude to all individual natural phenomena is one of appreciation of beauty, quiet and respectful observation, love and care. Since it is impossible for us to perceive or grasp the whole universe or the whole of nature at once, we can revere it in and through its constituent parts.

Most modern pantheists are monists in the sense that they believe there is only one basic type of substance - matter - rather than two different and distinct types, spirit and matter. They believe that all individual things have a common origin with humans, and are closely interlinked and interdependent in many ways. They and we interconnect through social systems and ecosystems and the greater system of Gaia, as well as through gravity and the universe-wide spread of signals and impacts.

Anyone with eyes can see that matter in the universe is arranged into distinct individual things: galaxies, stars, planets, trees, people. This diversity is an essential part of the beauty of nature and the night sky. Without diversity everything would be drably monotonous. Attempts to deny diversity usually end up in claiming that the visible world is mere illusion.

Scientific pantheism believes the universe is vibrantly real. So things are one in some senses, and many in other senses. They are linked in some senses, and separate in others. Anyone who claims that things are totally united, or totally separate, is flying in the face of everyday experience and of scientific evidence. Yes, there is a fundamental underlying unity. The latter two have their theism in common, while the former two have their monism in common. The latter two are "closer" in kind than the former, if and so far as one assumes that theism is a more significant common denominator than monism.

Like the notions of "Unity" and "Divinity," understanding transcendence and immanence is essential to any account of pantheism. A defining feature of pantheism is allegedly that God is wholly immanent. However, what is actually or mostly involved in this claim is that pantheism denies the theistic view that God transcends the world. Pantheism clearly does not claim that God in the theistic sense is immanent in the world since it denies such a God — transcendent or immanent — exists.

According to pantheism it is of course the pantheistic "God" i. Theists and pantheists do not differ as to whether the theistic God is immanent or transcendent, but whether the theistic God exists. So to differentiate between them on the basis of one's affirming and the other denying immanence is utterly confused.

Many of the difficulties associated with theistic transcendence are not dissipated for the pantheist when relevantly adjusted. For example, theistic transcendence presents prima facie difficulties concerning knowledge of and relations with God. The pantheist is part of the Unity, but both the nature of Unity, and its practical implications must be determined. In the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius this appears as much a problem for pantheists, if Aurelius is one, as knowing and relating to God is for theists.

In a sense, the Unity in pantheism is wholly immanent, but this is bare ontological immanence that follows from the Unity's all-inclusiveness i. Yet even this overstates the pantheistic commitment to immanence. Aspects of the Unity or the unifying principle often have a transcendent aspect to them.

Unity is "all-inclusive" but with the possible exception of Spinoza, pantheists generally deny complete immanence. Thus, the metaphysical Tao informs everything and is part of the all-inclusive Unity, but it does have a transcendent aspect to it.

It does transcend the phenomenal world of "myriad things. So the claim that pantheists deny "God's" transcendence is altogether misleading on several counts unless taken to mean what it usually does mean when asserted by theists — which is that pantheists deny the transcendence of a theistic God. If pantheism is seen as the quintessential expression of divine immanence, then it is not difficult to see why it might be combined with panpsychism or animism.

Like pantheism, both of these express a kind of pervasive immanence — "mind" in the former case and "living soul," "spirit," or "animal life" in the latter.

But however consonant or combined with pantheism these may be, they should be distinguished from both from each other and from pantheism. None of these three views entail one another, and the suggestion that pantheism and panpsychism naturally go together is vague apart from specific accounts of the two positions. What immediately sets panpsychism apart from pantheism is its belief that mental activity, usually of a kind we can only at times be mildly aware of, is all-pervasive.

Although such a supposition is not necessarily inconsistent with pantheism, it is not part of pantheism. It does not reject these distinctions, but implies that Unity ranges over such divisions. There are other major differences between the two positions as well. Pantheism is a much broader theory. It has implications beyond the scope of panpsychism where the latter is seen as an account of the origin of mind and the relation between mind and matter. These positions may be intrinsic to particular versions of pantheism, but pantheism as such is broader than these and distinct from them.

But does pantheism require an alternative doctrine of creation? What might such a doctrine be? For pantheism, creation remains problematic and even mysterious. However, difficulties associated with the theistic doctrine of creation ex nihilo i. God creating the world out of nothing vanish. If pantheism requires a creation doctrine, some type of emanationism seems most plausible. This is the type usually associated with, and probably most congenial to pantheism e.

Taoism, the Stoics, Plotinus — although pantheists can also eschew such doctrines. Assuming pantheism does require a doctrine or view about creation, what can be said positively about it? Pantheism has a range of options unavailable to theism since the theistic doctrine is extrapolated from scripture.

A pantheist might be a kind of existentialist with regard to questions like "Why is there anything at all? This might be seen as a refusal to deal with the issue of creation — as rejecting the idea that pantheism requires a theory of creation suited to the notion of a divine Unity. But this is not necessarily so.

For all its seeming negativity, this is a positive position and not one that simply denies other views. It is a theory of origin or creation that could be acceptable to some pantheists. One reason any account of origin, including the view of existence as a brute fact, might be rejected as being especially relevant to pantheism, is that the account is not thought to be intrinsically connected to the notion of Unity.

Indeed, pantheists might reject the idea that they require an account of creation intrinsic to their idea of Unity. Instead, any account that does not conflict with the way in which Unity is conceived of might be accepted. In distinguishing between creation ex nihilo and emanationism as he does, Macquarrie makes it easy to see why emanationism is often closely associated with pantheism.

Emanationism is the view that "creation" is not a "making," but in some sense a "flowing forth" from God or its origin, as Macquarrie puts it. And, what "flows forth" "maintains a closer relation to [its] origin. It participates in the origin, and the origin participates in it. Even though doctrines of creation ex nihilo do not necessarily conflict with that central pantheistic claim, they are usually seen as doing do — partly because they are associated with other incompatible theistic elements e.

On the other hand, emanationism appears to provide a doctrine which — if not an explicit ground on which to base pantheism — is at least one that is seen as congenial. As a doctrine of creation, it may even provide a partial basis for pantheism — as it has arguably for Plotinus, Eriugena, and even for Spinoza where "God" is the immanent cause of all things. The view that God is the "immanent cause" of things is a kind of creation doctrine for Spinoza and a basis for Unity.

So far as Lao Tzu has a doctrine of creation it too is emanationist. The Tao is "the primordial natural force, possessing an infinite supply of power and creativity" Ku-ying 6. Not only does the Tao create things — it is responsible for, or makes possible, their growth. Emanationism tends to affirm rather than deny a common ontological, substantial, and evaluative base among everything that exists e.

It is therefore seen as in keeping with the central tenets of pantheism, and where pantheists adhere to a doctrine of creation it tends to be emanationist. Since Unity must partly be explained evaluatively, the fact that emanationism is often linked to the "Good" provides further reason for supposing it consonant with pantheism.

Thus, although Macquarrie is right in claiming that the emanationist view of creation "does not necessarily lead to pantheism," the implication is that it often does. The problem of evil is basically a theistic one that is not directly pertinent to pantheism. It is not, as Owen 72 claims, "an embarrassment" intellectually speaking, to pantheists, nor can it be.

The "problem of evil," as it appears in classical theism, cannot be relevant to pantheism since pantheism rejects all of the aspects of theism that are essential to generating the problem. The "problem of evil" is peculiar to theism. This conflicts with the common view among Spinoza's earliest critics that pantheism, unlike theism, can neither account for evil nor offer any resolution to the problem of evil.

The reason for claiming pantheism cannot account for evil usually rests on an unwarranted conflation of pantheism with monism, and on the even more untoward supposition that the pantheist's "God" is "theistic" in important respects.

It is not the case that pantheism need not address the existence of evil and associated moral issues. It offers both its own formulation s of a "problem of evil" and its own responses. However, the very idea of evil may be something the pantheist wishes to eschew.

The pantheist may prefer, as most contemporary ethical theorists do, to talk of what is morally or ethically right and wrong. The term "evil" could be retained and applied to particular usually extreme instances of moral wrongness, but it would be understood in a sense that divorces it from its original theological and metaphysical context.

Given the classical argument from evil in either its logical or empirical versions it is surprising that anyone should think evil presents any problem whatsoever for the pantheist; for example, that evil counts against the existence of the pantheistic Unity in a way similar to the way in which it counts against the existence of the theistic God. Evil might be taken to be indicative of a lack of pantheistic Unity, as evidence of some kind of chaos instead.

But it cannot count against the existence of a pantheistic Unity in the way it can count against the existence of a theistic God. The argument from evil states that given the following propositions it is either impossible that God exists, or it improbable that God exists. The pantheist rejects the proposition needed to generate the problem to begin with.

The pantheist accepts 3 "The world contains preventable evil. But since there is no such God why suppose that proposition 3 requires some kind of special explanation or is cause for any "unease" on the part of the pantheist? The existence of preventable evil, for all that has been, does not even constitute a prima facie reason for rejecting the coherence of a pantheistic notion of Unity, or the probability of the existence of Unity.

Certainly it is not incompatible with 1 since the pantheist denies the truth of 1 , and it is not incompatible with 2 which is only hypothetically true for the pantheist. The pantheist has no need to explain evil, or to explain evil away — at least not in any way resembling theism's need to do so.

Evil may be a problem for the pantheist, but it is not the kind of problem that it is for the theist. It does not even conflict, prima facie with the existence of a divine Unity.

Pantheism does not claim that its divine Unity is a "perfect being" or being at all generally , or that it is omniscient etc. Surely it is mistaken to interpret Spinoza's "God" as "perfect" and "omniscient" etc. It might be supposed that the existence of evil is inconsistent or incongruous with the "divinity" of the Unity.

But this would have to argued. In theism it is assumed that what is divine cannot also be in part evil. But why assume this is the case with pantheism? Even in Otto's account of the "holy" the holy has a demonic aspect.

There seems little reason to suppose that what is divine cannot also, in part, be evil. At any rate, there is little reason for the pantheist to argue that what is divine can also be evil, since they can deny that evil falls within the purview of the divine Unity. To say that everything that exists constitutes a divine Unity i. There can be a Unity and it can be divine without everything about it always, or even sometimes, being divine. Pantheists, like theists, tend to be "moral realists.

With the exception of religious ethics, moral realism has not been a widely accepted philosophical position in recent times. However, the pantheist, like the theist, is not troubled by the fact that her moral realism is based on metaphysical assumptions that some regard as otiose. Furthermore, pantheists, like theists, generally think that moral judgements, and value judgments generally, are not empirically verifiable — at least not in the way one verifies matters of fact generally.

They are properties that one can, in principle, verify that an object or action has or lacks. Some ethical "naturalists" e. For example, a morally right action is sometimes equated with the action which "produces the greatest good for the greatest number. Pantheists, however, generally believe that moral properties are both distinct from natural properties and are not entailed by them.

Thus, they are usually "nonnaturalists. Despite their nonnaturalism, pantheists, like theists, reject G. Moore's contention that these properties i. For the theist the fact that "X is wrong" will be explained, and partially analysed, in terms of even if not reducible to nonnatural facts about God's will and nature.

And, for the pantheist the fact that "X is wrong" will be explained, and partially analysed, in terms of even if not reducible to nonnatural facts about the divine Unity. Nonnaturalism is the position most congenial to pantheism, but a pantheist could make a case for being an ethical naturalist just as one could argue for a naturalistic theistic ethics.

Pantheism leaves the option between ethical naturalism and ethical nonnaturalism open. For the pantheist, though perhaps not for the theist, value-properties and predicates may be empirical or natural, or supervene upon natural properties, even if they are not entailed by such properties.

So pantheists may be ethical naturalists. This may be the case even if assertions containing value predicates are not taken to be empirically verifiable in any straightforward way as they often are for naturalism.

Such value-predicates are not "empirical" in a narrow sense in which facts in the physical or even psychological sciences are empirical; but neither are they facts about some transcendent reality. Pantheism may, in a sense, deny the existence of any properties that are not "natural.

It is not accidental that pantheism is often taken to be a view inherently sympathetic to ecological concerns. This makes a decision to deal with ecology alongside pantheistic ethics less artificial than it might be if I were discussing, for example, theism and ethics — or a particular normative theory of ethics.

There is a tendency to picture pantheists i. This has roots in the Stoics' veneration of nature, and in the much later nature mysticism, and perhaps pantheism, of some of the nineteenth century poets such as Wordsworth and Whitman. Lawrence and Gary Snyder who explicitly "identify" with and extol nature, and claim people's close association and identification with "nature" and the "natural" is necessary to well-being.

The belief in a divine Unity, and some kind of identification with that Unity, is seen as the basis for an ethical framework and "way of life" that extends beyond the human to non-human and non-living things.

The divine Unity is, after all, "all-inclusive. A pantheistic ecological ethic will not be anthropocentric. This rules out the notion of man as a "steward of nature," whether his own or God's, who is responsible for nature.

It also rules out utilitarian, contractarian, and Kantian approaches as providing an ultimate basis since they are anthropocentric. It does not, however, rule out contractarian etc. Applying anthropocentrically conceived principles to environmental issues would suffice in many cases, but not all, to sound reasoning about the environment.

The practical problem environmentally speaking has been that almost no principles have been applied until recently. Selfish economic "forces," i. The situation here is no different than with respect to theism.

For the theist, ultimate justification of ethics resides in a view about the nature of God. But the theist is not prevented, qua theist, from invoking less ultimate ethical principles. The pantheist's ethic, her environmental ethic and her ethics more generally, will be metaphysically based in terms of the divine Unity.

It will be based on the Unifying principle which accounts for an important commonality, and it will be the grounds for extending one's notion of the moral community to other living and non-living things.

Everything that is part of the divine Unity as everything is is also part of the moral community. Aldo Leopold , says, "The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively, the land … A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. An anthropocentric view of morality can at best make the non-human and non-living world an object of moral consideration.

But it cannot, according to some, provide a basis for regarding those things as having a "good" of their own or as being non-human members of a moral community. Pantheists and theists will generally reject any environmental ethic as unsound if it fails to regard the non-human world as a full-fledged member of the moral community. In their view, to do otherwise is ultimately to rest the prospects of environmental well-being on the good will of the only members of the moral community there are — humans.

This is seen like resting the welfare of colonies on the goodwill of the colonisers. In order to enlarge our understanding of the moral community in the appropriate ways a metaphysical basis for an environmental ethic is needed which limits the significance of the anthropocentric view.

Furthermore, it is clear that those, like deep ecologists, who argue that our notion of the moral community must be enlarged to include the "good" of the non-human and non-living, and that it is metaphysically correct to do so, also claim that practical consequences are involved. The issue is not merely one of providing a rational basis for an environmental ethic.

It may seem that pantheists can claim that ethics and an approach to ecology should be kept separate from, or that they are separate from, the more general pantheistic view that asserts the existence of a divine Unity. A kind of "separation between church and environment" might be proposed.

But I doubt that such a separation is possible. The pantheist, like the theist or atheist takes the nature of reality as determinative of ethical requirements. Since Unity is predicated upon some evaluative consideration e. This situation in regard to pantheism is not too different than the one for theism. For the theist, ethical requirements and evaluative concerns of all sorts are connected to God's alleged goodness, and overall nature.

Like the term "evil," "salvation" may be rejected by pantheists as being too integral to the theistic world view they reject. It is a term borrowed from theism and one not consonant with pantheism. I use the term "salvation" with this in mind. Pantheistic ethics are, in some ways, Aristotelian.

For pantheism the notion of "the good life" as a regulative ideal — a telos or end to be strived for — is an aspect of salvation. This can be explained by examining some similarities between pantheistic ethics and Aristotelianism. The pantheist has what Paul Taylor calls "an essentialist conception of happiness. The pantheist's conception of human nature, her philosophical anthropology, is generally broader and less specific than the others. When goals are stipulated that man qua man should achieve this indicates an essentialist conception of human nature.

Furthermore, in an essentialist conception of happiness one which presupposes that there is such a thing as an essential human nature , "happiness" is largely a function of how well one fulfils one's essential nature. Pantheism's wide conception of human nature allows for a broad range of ways for people to achieve happiness. There are fewer ways for the Aristotelian or theist to achieve happiness than there are for the pantheist. To the extent that a human being is able to achieve "happiness" by actualising the properties that "define the good of man as such" — they will be leading an intrinsically good life.

Pantheism has a nonanthropocentric conception of human well-being. The human good is characterised partly in terms of relational properties. One must have a certain kind of relation to the Unity in order to live "properly.

When a person exemplifies their essential human nature in this way — and it can only be exemplified in this relational way — they are living the "Good" life and can thereby achieve well-being and happiness. This nonanthropocentric conception of human well-being constitutes pantheism's standard of human perfection and virtue.

It is a standard of intrinsic value. As in the case of Aristotle's essentialist conception of the nature of things, the Human Good defined as it is in terms of human nature will be different from an animal's good or a plant's good.

For the pantheist, the Good of these other things must also be understood partly in terms of their relation to the Unity. Furthermore, the Good associated with various things humans, plants, etc. There is no standard external to each kind of thing by which all things can be measured in terms of perfection, or virtue, or intrinsic value. There is no such thing as intrinsic value per se given an essentialist account of the nature's of things which includes essentialist standards of perfection.

It is not just wrong to say that a human being is intrinsically more valuable than a tree. It is also nonsense. Of course this does not mean trees should not be used by people. Taylor claims that according to the essentialist conception of human nature, the value achieved in human life by fulfilling the standard of intrinsic value is independent its consequences in the lives of others.

If this is right then the pantheist will reject any unqualified account of the essentialist's standard of human perfection and virtue. Indeed, an Aristotelian need not hold such an absolute non-consequentialist account either. Intrinsic value is, of course, value that is non-derivative. But, what determines the intrinsic goodness in a person's life will, for the pantheist, rely on that person's relationship to the Unity.

A person's "good" is partially constituted by the divine Unity of which everything is a part. In pantheistic terms it makes little sense to speak of the intrinsic value of a human life as measured against a standard independent of how that life affects others, since for the pantheist all such value, even so-called "intrinsic value," is partly derivative.

The standard of intrinsic value and perfection cannot be determined without reference to the divine Unity. The essential nature and well-being of a person, or anything else, cannot be analysed apart from its context in relation to the Unity and everything it includes.

Although both theism and pantheism have essentialist conceptions of human nature, well-being on either of those accounts cannot be achieved apart from one's relation to others, or the consequences of one's actions for others. And, the pantheist and theist are not the only kind of essentialists for whom consequences and relations matter. For the Aristotelian, in order to achieve well-being it is necessary to develop a certain kind of character.

This requires, in part, certain virtues e. Since the development and display of character and virtue is connected in significant ways with the consequences of an individual's actions in relation to other people — the concept of one life having "intrinsic value" apart from how it affects any other life is vacuous. Aristotle's account of the virtues makes a practical impossibility of living a "good life" that is fundamentally bad for others. Plato too claims that the virtuous life has its rewards for all.

Thus, essentialist conceptions of human nature and the Good need not preclude, and may even entail, an account of persons in relation to other things. For the pantheist, "realising the good for man as man" must be interpreted in terms of the Unity. For pantheism, an essentialist account of human nature does not suggest that there is necessarily only one kind of ideal person or way to achieve happiness.

An essentialist conception of human nature may recognise a range of human natures compatible with "Human Nature" as such. Just as various plants are constituted in such a way that their different requirements must be met if they are to thrive and flourish i.

The pantheist maintains that there is no such thing as an i. Yet given various human natures, well-being can only be achieved to the extent that the individual satisfies their own nature — achieve their own potential — in their particular circumstances in relation to the Unity. Pantheists eschew hierarchies that have as a criterion for the "good life" any particular intrinsic feature that certain human beings may have which others lack. A good mind used in a good way may help one lead a better life, but so will good looks and a good job.

Pantheists deny personal immortality. There is no life after death in the sense that it is "they" who survive. Historically, the denial of personal immortality is one of pantheism's most distinctive features.

God is impersonal in the sense that God retreated from the universe after its creation, uninterested in listening to or interacting with believers.

Pantheism is not animism. Animism is the belief that animals, trees, rivers, mountains—all things—have a spirit. However, these spirits are unique rather than being part of a greater spiritual whole. These spirits are frequently approached with reverence and offerings to ensure continued goodwill between humanity and the spirits.

Baruch Spinoza introduced pantheistic beliefs to a wide audience in the 17th century. However, other, less known thinkers had already expressed pantheistic views such as Giordano Bruno, who was burnt at the stake in for his highly unorthodox beliefs.

He also stated that "science without religion is lame; religion without science is blind," underscoring that pantheism is neither anti-religious nor atheistic.

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Catherine Beyer. Wicca Expert. Updated August 20,